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A Comparative Framework: How broadly applicable is 
a “rigorous” critical junctures framework? 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper tests Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework for examining critical junctures.  This 
framework sought to incorporate the concept of ideational change in understanding critical junctures.  Until 
its development, frameworks utilised in identifying critical junctures were subjective, seeking only to 
identify crisis, and subsequent policy changes, arguing that one invariably led to the other, as both occurred 
around the same time.  Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) hypothesised ideational change as an intermediating 
variable in their framework, determining if, and when, a crisis leads to radical policy change.  Here we test 
this framework on cases similar to, but different from, those employed in developing the exemplar.  This 
will enable us determine whether the framework’s relegation of ideational change to a condition of crisis 
holds, or, if ideational change has more importance than is ascribed to it by this framework.  This will also 
enable us determined if the framework itself is robust, and fit for the purposes it was designed to perform – 
indentifying the nature of policy change. 
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Introduction 
For historical institutionalists (Pierson, 2000; Steinmo, 1989) crises are often regarded as 
the starting points for change.  Scholarly interpretations of institutional change have seen 
the past divided into long periods of normalcy, interrupted by critical junctures.  
However, until recently, critical junctures, ‘a concept needed in underpinning the 
analyses of temporal processes, have received limited discussion’ (Pierson, 2004: 5-6).  
This was part of an overall absence of tools for making sense of institutional change 
(Thelen, 1999: 388).  Of late, historical institutionalism has moved away from the 
concept of critical junctures, in search of new ways of demonstrating how institutions are 
remade (Pierson, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  This left the critical junctures concept 
languishing in a conceptual cul-de-sac.  Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 342) pointed to an 
overall absence of methodological/conceptual rigour in our understanding of critical 
junctures. 
Earlier scholars, such as Collier and Collier (1991), examined critical junctures by 
means of unwieldy frameworks, or in the case of Fearon (1991; 1996) counterfactual 
analysis.  Hogan (2005; 2006) sought to develop frameworks with greater rigour.  But, all 
their efforts involved narrow, in many instances case specific, criteria, along with largely 
arbitrary standards.  Macrohistorical analysts developed frameworks suitable for their 
own subject matters, but ill suited to studies of critical junctures in other fields (Capoccia 
and Kelemen, 2007: 342). 
To correct for these weaknesses, Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) developed a 
detailed, three-stage, critical juncture framework, they claim is capable of explaining why 
certain crises lead to critical junctures in policies, whereas others do not.  Their underling 
hypothesis is a critical juncture in policy consists of: crisis, ideational change (extant 
ideational collapse and new ideational consolidation), and radical policy change.  The 
framework is an attempt to rectify what Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 343) call the 
‘paucity of conceptual instruments available to define, study, and compare critical 
junctures.’  Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) argue that crisis is a necessary, but 
insufficient, condition for a paradigm shift in policy.  A crisis not followed by ideational 
change will only result in a first or second order policy change, whereas a crisis followed 
by ideational change will witness a third-order change/paradigm shift in policy, which 
combined constitutes a critical juncture.  Ideational change therefore, is the 
“differentiating factor” between a crisis that leads to a paradigm shift in policy (critical 
juncture) and one that leads to less significant policy change (Hogan and Doyle, 2007; 
2008). 
We wish to investigate if ideational change is an integral component of critical 
junctures, and if the overall framework developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) is 
capable of identifying and explaining various degrees of policy change.  Laudable as 
including endogenous factors (ideational change) is in critical junctures, doing so in the 
manner set out in the framework relegates ideational change to an adjunct of crisis.  A 
framework such as this ignores the fact that even if its objective conditions are not met, 
within the historical institutionalist tradition actors’ path dependent expectations of 
economic performance might be such that a crisis could still constitute a critical juncture.  
Such a finding would relegate the importance of ideational change to something less than 
a decisive variable in our understanding of critical junctures, while simultaneously 
relegating the significance of the framework’s objective criteria for identifying economic 
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crisis as well.  Through our detailed comparative case studies we show that a quantifiable 
macro-economic crisis is not a necessary precondition for a paradigm shift in macro-
economic policy to occur.  In fact, we contend that the perception of crisis, identified 
through qualitative observables, as opposed to its verifiable identification through 
quantitative observables, can be crucial in influencing the trajectory of policy 
formulation.  
 
 
Section 1: Our Understandings of Critical Junctures  
For historical institutionalism the focus is on choices made early in the history of a polity.  
These choices will have a persistent influence (Peters, 1999: 210).  Historical 
institutionalism is effective at explaining what happens, and in weaving a narrative that 
captures a good deal of the reality of history.  Choices made at time T influence choices 
at time T+1 (Berman, 1998: 380).  However, explaining change has been problematic.  
‘Traditionally, students of institutional change focused on the importance of crisis, 
situations of large-scale public dissatisfaction or even fear stemming from an unusual 
degree of social unrest and/or threats to national security’ (Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 
184).  Wars, revolutions, coup d’état, changing balance of power, demographic changes, 
and social movements were regarded as critical junctures, producing overwhelming 
mandates for policy and or/structural change.  Such unanticipated events tended to 
discredit existing institutions and policies, consequently triggering the change (Tilly, 
1975).   
Critical junctures are seen as resulting in the adoption of a particular institutional 
arrangement from amongst alternatives (Mahoney, 2000: 512).  Thereafter, a particular 
developmental pathway is established funnelling units in a specific direction, and is 
effectively fixed (Mahoney, 2003: 53; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 9).  Thus, critical 
junctures set the tone for what comes in their wake. 
 However, there are cases in which institutions change in unexpected ways, and 
the approach appears at a loss to explain them.  Sometimes there are no wars, or other 
great events, such as those listed above, that can be held to account for dramatic policy 
and/or structural changes.  ‘This is the weakest and most difficult point in institutional 
analysis’ (Rothstein, 1996: 153).  Thus, the idea that wars, or revolutions, can be 
regarded as critical junctures when it suits is too simplistic, reducing the concept to a 
catchall solution to be employed when situations warrant.  This raises all sorts of 
questions as to what exactly is a critical juncture, and how do we define a critical 
juncture? 
For some authors the duration of a critical juncture can be very brief, while for 
others it can mark an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney 2001).  Collier and 
Collier (1991) developed a critical junctures framework for examining national 
development in Latin America.  Their definition implied that institutional innovation 
occurs over a long timeframe (Thelen, 2004: 215).  Analyzing the liberalization of 
Central America, Mahoney (2001) found some critical junctures lasting decades, while 
their after effects had shorter duration.  However, electoral landslides are also regarded as 
critical junctures, as they produce strong mandates for policy change (Garrett and Lange, 
1995: 628).  Contextualised by the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Haggard 
(1988: 91) argued that economic depressions lead to a questioning of extant institutions, 
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and subsequent changes in polices.  Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework fell into 
the latter camp, in that it argued that critical junctures were swift events.  However, their 
framework differed from traditional historical institutionalist approaches in that it 
incorporated ideational change and policy change within the critical juncture concept, 
rather than treating critical junctures and subsequent ideational and policy changes as 
separate events.  In this framework crisis are just one part of a critical juncture, and on 
their own are insufficient to constitute a critical juncture.   
Clearly, the concept of critical junctures has been used by various scholars in 
addressing a wide range of issues.  All seem to agree that critical junctures ‘suggest the 
importance of formative moments for institutions and organisations’ (Pierson, 1993: 
602).  The concept is seen as a handy tool for linking a sequence of events.  However, the 
absence of a standard set of criteria for identifying critical junctures has been a weakness 
in the concept.  Thus, the ability to readily identify critical junctures, as is clamed by 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework, should mark a significant advance for the 
concept.     
 
 
Section 2: The Countries Selected for Examination 
To test Hogan and Doyle framework (2007; 2008) we employ the same case selection 
criteria they used of “most similar” and “most different.”  Based upon their requirement 
of “most similar” we select our cases from states that have been stable democracies since 
the first half of the twentieth century, and were founding members of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  These conditions tied together the 
principles of representative democracy and free market economy.  Employing their 
criteria of “most different” we utilized Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and 
consensual democracies in our case selection.  This category permits us control for 
varying institutional arrangements.  Employing this method of case selection, we are 
trying to ensure that the cases examined here, though not identical, are in many ways 
comparable. 
 As a result of the above criteria, and similar to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) 
papers, cases from Ireland and Sweden will be examined.  Both countries are small long-
standing democracies, and constitute advanced capitalist states.  Despite their similarities, 
in the periods in which we examine them, their economic performance was very 
different.  Sweden was a prosperous welfare orientated state during much of the latter 
half of the 20th century, while Ireland struggled to achieve sustained economic expansion.  
Nevertheless, their similarities ensure ‘the contexts of analysis are analytically 
equivalent, to a significant degree, while their differences place the ‘parallel processes of 
change in sharp relief’ (Collier, 1997: 40).  Thus, the framework itself will also be tested 
in a similar, but also different, environment to that in which it was previously scrutinized. 
 
 
Section 3: Framework to be Tested 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework is relatively simple.  A major 
crisis will cause agents to question the efficacy of the ideas underlying existing policy, 
resulting in the collapse of these ideas.  In response, change agents will propose different 
ideas to replace the failing ideas.  The ensuing period of ideational contestation will result 
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in either change agents consolidating around a replacement set of ideas, or, in the absence 
of new ideational consolidation continuance with extant failing ideas.  Should failing 
ideas endure, these will continue to inform institutional arrangements, and policy will 
only change marginally, or not at all.  However, if, in the wake of ideational collapse, 
change agents consolidate around new ideas, these will replace the failing ideas and 
significant policy change will follow.  The overall result will be a critical juncture.  So, 
for there to be a critical juncture in macroeconomic policy there must be a crisis, 
ideational change (extant ideational collapse + new ideational consolidation), and a 
radical policy change.  To identify each of these elements, a range of observable 
implications (or indicators) must be satisfied. 
To identify a macroeconomic crisis, the original framework presented ten 
observable implications.  Three of these were quantitative in nature, with the remainder 
qualitative.  However, the value of the quantitative observables is questionable, as they 
seem somewhat arbitrary in nature.  The qualitative observables seem somewhat stronger, 
but Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) do not appear to use any coding protocols.  In light of 
these weaknesses in the original framework we add another seven quantitative 
observables to give a further layer of thoroughness to the examination of economic data.  
In terms of coding the qualitative observables we simply conducted word searches for 
“crisis”, something rudimentary, but which Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) did not do. 
Nevertheless, we still recognise that identifying a macro-economic crisis requires 
a mix of subjective and objective deliberations (Pei and Adesnik, 2000: 139).  As a result, 
we utilise a total of 17 observable implications in our investigation of crisis.  These 
accept that a macro-economic crisis constitutes a severe economic low point (See 
Appendix A for all observables).  Multiple observables raise the question of how many 
should point to an empirical-theoretical fit to indicate economic crisis.  We argue that at 
least two thirds of all observables, for which there are findings, should point to economic 
crisis.   
 While regarding crises as important to critical junctures, the framework was built 
around the recognition that ideational change is crucial.  A crisis leads to a questioning of 
extant policies due to their failure to correct the situation.  Ideas will present a range of 
subsequent policy choices in light of crisis.  Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) contend that 
that significant policy change is dependent upon change agents (political and policy 
entrepreneurs) consolidating around a set of new ideas that will determine the path 
subsequent policy takes.  Their belief in the role of ideas in policy change is akin to that 
of Blyth (2002) and Golob (2003).  However, their identification of the role of various 
types of change agents, and the integration of the concepts of extant ideational collapse 
and new ideational consolidation from Legro (2000), marks a deeper understanding of 
where new ideas bubble up from, and how they become consolidated, in the event of 
crisis.     
 In this manner the framework locates ideational change as the intermediating 
factor between crisis and policy change.  For a crisis to result in a radical policy change 
there had to be ideational change.  The original framework set out seven observable 
implications with which to identify ideational change.  We keep these, differentiating 
them into those for identifying extant ideational collapse (first five); and those for 
identifying new idea consolidation (latter two) (Appendix B). 
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 Extant policies are no longer secure once their underlying ideas have been 
undermined.  Once the ideas policies are based upon have been widely questioned the 
issue is simply will policies change, and if so, to what extent.  To identify the nature of 
policy change, the framework utilised Hall’s (1993: 291) concepts of first, second and 
third order change.  The observables, based around these orders of policy change, enable 
the easy identification, and differentiation, of normal, and fundamental, shifts in a 
country’s macro-economic policies.  In this case, we keep the same observables as in the 
original framework (Appendix C).  The framework predicts that in the absence of 
ideational change policy change will be either first or second order, but never the third 
order.  However, the framework also predicted that confirmed ideational change (new 
ideas supported by a wide range of change agents, led by a political entrepreneur) leads to 
third order policy change – a new set of policies coming into force. 
This three stage framework presents a range of “objective” conditions that must 
be met for there to be a critical juncture.  These constitute the framework’s supposedly 
independent, but in reality also dependent, variables.  They are dependent in the sense 
that they must occur in sequence.  Before ideational change can occur there must be an 
identifiable crisis.  However, the range of observable selected by Hogan and Doyle 
(2007; 2008) to identify economic crisis are questionable.  The level of national debt is 
not ideal, as the rate of change in national debt would be better, and the observables 
based on inflation and interest rates seem largely arbitrary.  Before radical policy change 
can occur, there must be both a crisis and ideational change (again based on another set 
of observable implications).  Ideational change is presented in the framework as the 
intermediating variable between crisis and policy change.  A crisis not followed by 
ideational change is regarded as insufficient to result in a third order change in policy, 
and consequently a critical juncture.  This raises all sorts of questions as to what would 
happen if ideational change occurred in the absence of any definable crisis, or, for that 
matter, if a dramatic policy change took place in the absence of ideational change.   
A framework, such as this, ignores the fact that even if its objective conditions are 
not met, within the historical institutionalist tradition, actors’ path dependent expectations 
of economic performance might be such that a crisis could still constitute a critical 
juncture.  Such a finding would relegate the importance of ideational change to 
something less than a decisive variable in our understanding of critical junctures, while 
simultaneously relegating the significance of the framework’s objective criteria for 
identifying economic crisis as well.  Here we will test the framework’s supposed 
robustness, the clarity of its “objective” criteria, and its overall capacity to identify and 
explain policy change. 
 
Section 4: The Identification of Macro-economic Crisis 
 
Ireland 1986 -1987  
By 1987 the Irish economy was locked in a vicious circle of stagnation, rising taxes, and 
rocketing debt.  There was growing recognition amongst most sections of the community 
that things could not go on as they had, otherwise the economy would collapse.  As can 
be seen from Figure 1 unemployment was close to 20 per cent by 1987.  The numbers at 
work had been in decline since the late 1970s, falling from a peak of 1,145,000 in 1979 to 
1,095,100 by 1986 (Leddin and Walsh, 1998: 320).  On the positive side, inflation had 
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been declining since the early 1980s, and interest rates, which had been very high at the 
start of the decade, were also falling, but more slowly. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In terms of growth, the Irish economy performed poorly.  GDP growth, and GDP per 
capita growth was stagnant throughout much of the early 1980s (Figure 2).  In 1986 both 
of these measures shrank, an indictment of a poorly performing economy.  GDP growth 
averaged over five years was only 2 per cent.  As can also been seen in Figure 2, GNI per 
capita growth dropped dramatically during the first half of the 1980s, with a low of 1.6 
per cent in 1986.     
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The debt/GDP ratio exceeded 100 per cent in 1984 (Figure 3), before peaking at over 124 
per in 1987.  In that period the debt/GDP ratio rose at an average of 4 per cent per annum.  
In real terms the national debt jumped from just over €10 billion in 1980 to over €30 
billion by 1987.1  At the same time, imports and exports slumped, this reflected in the 
declining in trade openness.  By 1987 it was clear the level of activity in the Irish 
economy was decreasing.   
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
We can see from Figure 4 that there was great volatility in relation to FDI.  A series of 
dramatic peaks and troughs mark the variations in FDI inflow throughout the early 1980s.  
At the same time, the overall change in FDI inwards stock was miniscule.  Thus, there 
was a general stagnation in overall FDI, which continued until economic recovery began 
in the early 1990s.  Gross capital formation (as a percentage of GDP) gradually 
diminished during the mid 1980s, falling below 20 per cent by 1983.  It was only in 1990 
that the rate of gross capital formation again exceeded 20 per cent.      
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
There was unanimity in the domestic and foreign media concerning the economy.  The 
Irish Times used the term ‘battered’ to describe the economy in February 1987,2 while, 
according to the Irish Independent, manufacturing industry was in serious crisis, with one 
in six jobs disappearing between 1980 and 1987.3  The Economist pointed out that ‘the 
people of Ireland were deeply in debt to the outside world, three times as much per head 
as Mexico.’4  During the long recession of the 1980s ‘the government borrowed vast 
sums, and spent them on welfare services that could be sustained only by more 
borrowing.’5  Thus, began a vicious circle of indebtedness.  The Irish Times noted that 
some economic commentators were advocating debt repudiation.6  Overall, the general 
consensus in the newspapers was one of stagnation and crisis.7 
 Economists delivered severe criticisms of both policy and performance.  Bacon et 
al., (1986: 1), writing for the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), commented 
that ‘the first half of the decade of the 1980s, taken as a whole, was a period of appalling 
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economic performance.’  Kennedy and Conniffe (1986: 288) observed that 'it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that Irish economic performance has been the least impressive in 
Western Europe, perhaps in all Europe.’  The ESRI’s overall view was that Irish 
economic performance had been appalling during the early 1980s.  A total of 254,526 
people were without work by 1987 (Daly 1994: 122).  Ireland had reached the unenviable 
position of topping Europe’s unemployment league.8 
The Central Bank regarded the economy with pessimism.  Its quarterly economic 
reports foresaw no prospects for immediate improvement in either growth or 
employment.9  More worryingly, it argued that the economic situation did not permit for 
increases in welfare benefits to needy members of society.10  Consequently, the 
increasing level of poverty, resulting from the depression, was eroding the lives of a 
growing segment of the population.11 
According to the OECD (1987: 11-15) between 1979 and 1987 Irish economic 
performance had been dire: slow growth, rapidly deteriorating public finances, stagnation 
of per capita disposable income, huge balance of payments deficits, industrial relations 
turmoil, and a large decrease in domestic demand.  As the OECD (1987: 77) put it: ‘by 
the mid-1980s a number of acute imbalances confronted the Irish economy.’ 
These imbalances were making the business community extremely worried.  
Leading businessman Tony O’Reilly warned of the dangers of IMF involvement, and the 
loss of economic sovereignty.12  Taoiseach FitzGerald stated that ‘the national debt, and 
interest payments, were rising faster than national income, and constituted a vicious 
circle.’13  The leader of the opposition, Charles Haughey, remarked that ‘the economy is 
at a total stand-still.14  Amongst the public consensus held that the country was in the 
midst of a serious financial crisis.15  Thus, ‘by 1987 the Irish economy was universally 
seen to have reached nadir.’16 
 
Sweden 1990-1992 
Although prosperity returned to Sweden during the 1980s, by the 1990s, the country was 
experiencing economic malaise.  Increasingly, the size of the public sector was seen as a 
principal factor in the country’s stagnation.  Public sector employment, which had 
accounted for about one fifth of total employment in the 1960s came to constitute over 35 
per cent of all employment in Sweden by the end of the 1980s (Olsson, 1990: 124).  
Public expenditure rose from 30 per cent of GDP in 1960, to over 60 per cent by the late 
1980s, making it the largest public sector in the world.17  Attempts to maintain industrial 
competitiveness, an enormous public sector, and full employment, resulted in rising 
inflation.18 
Inflation surpassed 10 per cent in 1990.  The Bank of International Settlement 
(BIS) observed that Sweden’s 10.5 per cent inflation rate was the worst of the ten leading 
industrialised countries.19  This failure to sustain non-inflationary growth resulted from a 
sluggish productivity growth.  As can be seen in Figure 5, interest rates peaked at 14 per 
cent in 1992, while unemployment stood at 6 per cent.  This was considered an 
extraordinary high level of unemployment in a country accustomed to levels below what 
is regarded the natural rate of unemployment. 
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
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When we examine indicators of economic performance we are confronted with a scene of 
stagnation.  GDP growth, after recovering from the setbacks of the early 1980s, fell 
dramatically by the end of that decade.  By the early 1990s the rate of GDP growth, and 
GDP per capita growth, were actually shrinking.  At the same time GNI per capita was 
declining.  Figure 6 clearly highlights the decline of the Swedish economy, with the 
measure for averaged GDP growth a clear indicator of the overall poor performance.   
 
FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
Whereas the debt/GDP ratio had been falling throughout the early 1980s, it started to rise 
from 1988 onwards, almost doubling in six years.  Between 1990 and 1992 Sweden’s 
debt/GAP ratio jumped by 34 per cent, and enormous increase in such a short time.  At 
the same time, Swedish trade openness, although dropping somewhat at the start of the 
1990s, recovered lost ground quickly, and by 1993 stood above 60 percent.  This was a 
similar level to what it had been five years earlier, although it was still far below the 1984 
high of almost 68 per cent.  The decline and recover of imports and exports was similar to 
overall recover of trade openness in the early 1990s.  Thus, despite the above figures 
pointing to slowing growth, the level of activity in economy was on the rebound by 1992.   
 
FIGURE 7 HERE 
 
From Figure 8 below we can see that there was a high level of volatility in FDI inflows to 
the economy throughout the 1980s.  But, what is clear is that the depths of the toughs 
were no match for the heights of the peaks.  Consequently, the level of FDI inflows 
increased throughout the period when seen as a whole.  We can also see that by the early 
1990s there was a decline in the level of FDI inward stock, and that gross capital 
formation was slowing somewhat.  Nevertheless, inward FDI stock, as a percentage of 
GDP, was rising gradually, having remained above 5 per cent during the early 1990s. 
 
FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
By 1991 the domestic and international media, national commentators, domestic and 
international organisations, and the central bank, were pointing out that the economy was 
in trouble.  Unemployment increased under the impact of the government’s austerity 
measures.20  The following year saw unemployment at 5.3 per cent, a post war peak.  
There was general fiscal instability, with the current budget deficit, public sector 
borrowing requirement, and national debt, rising rapidly.  The BIS observed that 
‘although inflation had been rising since 1986 in the ten leading industrialised countries 
Sweden had displayed the worst performance.’21  Economic growth, well below the 
OECD average of 3.5 per cent (Delsen and van Veen, 1992: 94), went into reverse in 
1991.22  The Washington Post argued that the people of Sweden were becoming 
increasingly troubled by the country’s slow growth, and doubted their ability to maintain 
the standard of living they were accustomed to.23  The Guardian pointed out that ‘this 
was the first time the economy has contracted since 1942.’24  For the Investors Chronicle 
recession, rising unemployment, and a soaring budget deficit indicate the embattled state 
of the economy.25  According to Aftonbladet, an unemployment rate of over 3 per cent, 
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while low in comparison to other European countries, was regarded as sky-high in 
Sweden.26  Svenska Dagbladet pointed out that new policies were needed to fix the 
economy.27  The Herald Sun argued that while Swedish companies invested only 10 per 
cent of their resources abroad in the early 1980s, this figure expanded to 75 per cent by 
the 1990s.28  The reason for this, according to Ulf Jakobsson, chief economist at Svenska 
Handsbanken, was that entrepreneurs faced so many taxes it was difficult to achieve a 
positive rate of return.29 
By 1991 most economists argued that the economy was in difficulty.  “Sweden is 
in a very severe recession.  There is a crisis in every major part of the public sector – 
health, education, childcare, and aged care,” said Anders Aslund, the country’s leading 
economist.30  The OECD (1992: 29) pointed out that those in training programmes were 
not counted as unemployed even though they had no jobs.  “Sometimes these 
programmes just tie people up and have the effect of keeping them away from real jobs,” 
observed economist Gunnar Eliasson.31   
The OECD (1990: 11) argued that during the late 1980s Sweden’s economy had 
overheated.  However, this problem remained unresolved prior to 1989 (OECD, 1990: 
27).  Swedish export performance was weak (OECD, 1990: 18).  Sweden had the largest 
budget surplus in the OECD in 1989, but the largest deficit by 1993 (OECD, 1994: 9).  
According to the OECD (1994: 11) ‘the current recession is unique in depth when 
measured by trend deviations of either output or employment.’  The OECD (1992: 99) 
was concerned that Swedish economic dynamism had suffered due to a lack of 
competition in the public sector and in parts of the private sector.  This reduced 
incentives to improve business efficiency.  Yet, despite all the negative opinions, by 
October 1991 The Financial Times was arguing that the economy had reached the bottom 
of its recession. 32 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
From Table 1 it is clear that Ireland (1986-1987), satisfies most of the observable 
implications.  Consequently, we argue that Ireland experienced a macroeconomic crisis in 
the period 1986-1987.  However, Sweden 1990-1992 satisfied just over half, but less than 
two thirds, of the 17 observable implications.  According to the Hogan and Doyle (2007; 
2008) framework Sweden 1990-1992 does not constitute a macroeconomic crisis. 
The next section examines both periods for ideational change, and if there was 
ideational change, did policy change followed?  If the central hypothesis of what 
constitutes a critical juncture is to hold, we would expect to possibly identify ideational 
and policy change in Ireland (1986-1987), but not in Sweden (1990-1992).  This is 
because the latter did not experience a macroeconomic crisis, and the occurrence of such 
a crisis is integral to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007: 2008) critical juncture hypothesis and 
framework – constituting its first stage. 
 
Section 5: The Identification of Ideational and Policy Change 
 
Ireland 1986-1987 
The Fine Gael/Labour coalition government experienced considerable difficulty devising 
an effective strategy to deal with the growing economic crisis (O’Byrnes, 1986).  ‘An 
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attempt to achieve fiscal correction and disinflation through increased taxation rather than 
expenditure reduction, completed the grim economic picture’ (McCarthy, 1999: 5).  The 
coalition’s handling of the economic crisis generated dissent and dissatisfaction with the 
mode of economic governance employed.  The business community was alarmed, with 
leading businessman, Michael Smurfit, observing that the continual delay in tackling the 
underlying economic problems would only make the cure more difficult to implement.33  
Tony O’Reilly warned ‘bitter’ and ‘hard’ decisions would have to be taken to right the 
economy.34 
The coalition government’s policy of distancing the trade unions from policy 
making ensured they remained fractious and critical (Collins, 1993; Wickham, 1992).  
The OECD, and the national media, were highly critical of the government.35  The Irish 
Independent observed that the coalition government had been disastrous.36  Opposition 
leader Charles Haughey (1986) denounced the policies of the coalition government, and 
supported union leaders’ calls for a return to social partnership agreements.  A step in this 
direction was taken when the Fianna Fáil began meeting with the unions.   
The problems with the economy, and extant policy’s inability to right the 
situation, produced a window of opportunity for alternative policy ideas to gain support.  
Eventually, various critiques coalesced into a constructive debate designed to generate 
new ideas to deal with the crisis.  Despite being institutionally embedded, the reigning 
economic orthodoxy, and all this entailed, including avoidance of corporatism, collapsed 
as agents agreed collectively that it was inadequate and should be replaced. 
In the context of economic despair the government sought to build support among 
the economic and social interests for a national recovery strategy.  Through the 
involvement of major economic interests and government representatives, the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) became the forum for the generation of new ideas.  
In autumn 1986 the NESC produced A Strategy for Development, 1986-1990.  This 
predicted existing policies would lead to further emigration, deterioration of the public 
finances, and reduced flexibility for policy makers.  The report emphasized the necessity 
of a national plan to tackle the public expenditure crisis.  It laid out a comprehensive set 
of alternative economic ideas to replace extant arrangements, making the NESC the 
primary policy entrepreneur. 
At the time politicians of all political hues were coming to realize that something 
radical had to be done to improve the situation.  Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald 
acknowledged that ‘the national debt and interest payments were rising faster than 
national income, and constituted a vicious circle.’37  He regarded the debt burden as a set 
of handcuffs binding the country with high taxes and interest rates.38 
Eventually, agents began coalescing around the ideas propagated by the NESC.  
These included an integrated economic policy focused on stabilising and then reducing 
the debt-GNP ratio; reform of the tax structure; promotion of the traded structure; and the 
removal of social inequalities (NESC, 1986: 306).  While still in opposition Fianna Fáil 
sought to build upon the NESC’s consensus, and inject the ideas underlying it into the 
policy domain.  To this end Fianna Fail sought to bring the peak trade union and 
employer organisations back into the policy making process, from which they had been 
excluded by the collation government.  Fianna Fáil embraced the new ideology of 
restraint and consensus, its leadership adopting the role of a political entrepreneur.  The 
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general election of February 1987 saw all political leaders making the case for fiscal 
rectitude,39 with Haughey stressing economic recovery as the primary issue.40   
Fianna Fail fought the 1987 election on a platform opposing the Fine Gael-Labour 
model of economic management, stressing the need for economic recovery.41  Opinion 
polls prior to the election found unemployment the major issue for the electorate, 
followed by taxation, prices, and finance, indicating that the public were generally 
dissatisfied with the current situation.42  Most importantly, the method and approach set 
out in A Strategy for Development was absorbed into Fianna Fáil’s election manifesto 
(Breen et al., 1990: 220).  Fianna Fail won the election, carrying with it a new set of 
economic ideas.  Thus, with agents in agreement on a new set of economic ideas to 
replace the old, a new economic orthodoxy was consolidated.  They now had to transform 
the ideas into meaningful policy. 
Prior to the election Haughey remarked that the economic situation was one of 
extreme difficulty (Trench et al., 1987: 18).  He said that people were worried about 
unemployment and emigration, and that they ‘wanted someone to take the situation by 
the scruff of the neck.’43  As the new Fianna Fáil administration was a minority it was 
considered likely to want to avoid the electoral risk of implementing severe spending 
cuts.  However, the new administration sought to implement far reaching expenditure 
reductions.44  Following the NESC’s recommendations, the authorities set as their 
budgetary objective a reduction in the debt/GNP ratio.  The new government’s first 
budget sought much greater fiscal adjustment than had been achieved in previous years.  
This constituted a marked shift in policy emphasis, and a determination to reduce the 
deficit (OECD 1989: 16).  Expenditure fell by £250 million, while tax revenue increased 
by £117 million (OECD 1987: 21).  The implementation of these measures was helped 
enormously by the opposition supporting the government in its efforts to fix the 
economy. 
Given the scale of the task Fianna Fáil set itself, it wanted to avoid confrontations.  
Consequently, the government promoted talks on a national pay agreement in accordance 
with the principles of the NESC report (Jacobsen 1994: 177).  The administration was 
interested in securing a three-year tripartite agreement throughout the economy (Allen, 
1997: 170).  ‘The Taoiseach invited the unions, and the other social partners, to take part 
in an effort to spur recovery by means of consensus’ (Mjoset 1992: 383).  Fianna Fáil 
supported a centralised pay agreement for its benefits in terms of industrial peace and 
union commitment to painful spending cuts.45  Where the coalition government had 
opposed any revival of this form of union influence,46 Fianna Fáil revealed a preference 
for defusing, rather than opposing, industrial conflict (Hardiman 1988: 237).  Thus, the 
neo-corporatist agreement, the Program for National Recovery, was born.  Subsequent 
years saw more agreements, all based on a shared understanding of the problems facing 
the economy and society, and the policies required to address them (NESC 1996: 14).  
The social partnership shifted Ireland’s political economy from a British towards a 
European mode of consensus policy making.   
Economic crisis led to a collapse of confidence in the prevailing economic 
orthodoxy.  Outside influences, and policy entrepreneurs, advocated a replacement set of 
ideas involving fiscal restraint, tax reforms, and consensual policy formulation.  
Consolidation of change agents around this new economic orthodoxy was achieved 
through the political entrepreneurship of the Fianna Fail leadership.  The party, once in 
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government, altered the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind economic 
policy, to conform with the new ideational orthodoxy, resulting in a third order policy 
change.  Thus, we have a macro-economic crisis, ideational change, and a radical change 
in macro-economic policy, which, according to the overarching hypothesis, constitutes a 
critical juncture.  This policy change was one of the pillars upon with Irish economic 
recovery was built. 
 
Sweden 1990-1992 
Sweden’s economic difficulties in the early 1980s provided a window of opportunity for 
monetarist ideas.  Following the Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet’s (SAP) election in 
1982, a number of agents began coalescing around these ideas.  The Svenska 
Arbetsgivarforening (SAF) created Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS), and 
Timbro, disseminated monetarist ideas, which gained ground, especially among 
influential economists (Blyth 2002: 214-15).  Political and policy entrepreneurs, 
consisting of the leaderships of the Conservative and Liberal parties, the policy elites 
outside the original social bargain, the SNS and SAF, began aggressively propagating 
these ideas (Blyth, 1997: 239). 
Meanwhile, the media continued to harangue the SAP government, and its policy 
failures.  The New York Times stated that the economy was stagnant.47  The Financial 
Times pointed out that in 1991, under the impact of weak foreign demand, and losses in 
competitiveness, Swedish exporters lost ground internationally.48  According to Business 
Week by the autumn of 1991 the Social Democrats were already staging a tactical retreat 
from the welfare state.49  By this time, according to The Economist, Sweden’s industrial 
output was in freefall.50  Some of the highest taxes in the world, prohibitive interest rates, 
and high inflation smothered the once-robust private sector.  Consequently, according to 
the Christian Science Monitor, ‘Swedish industry, with no incentive to stay, is now 
scrambling to set up operations abroad, where the returns are higher.’51  Most worrying of 
all for the SAP Dagens Industri observed that many Swedes had discovered that they 
were social democrats by habit and not conviction.52   
Once the economy faltered, critiques of the SAP by the media, the opposition, and 
the OECD, enabled change agents to propose monetarism as an alternative economic 
paradigm.  In an environment of unfulfilled economic expectations, contestation of the 
existing economic orthodoxy by agents, agreed on its inadequacy and need for 
replacement, resulted in its collapse.  From the mid-1980s onwards the SAF, among 
others, increasingly called into question the corporatist system (de Geer, 1992: 155-157).  
The SAF assumed the role of a vigorous policy entrepreneur, mounting intense publicity 
campaigns to improve the electoral prospects of the Liberal and Conservative parties.  
The SAF’s ideas on privatization, and deregulation, also influenced the SAP government 
which, to combat the crisis, began incorporating monetarist ideas into policy.  In 1990 
currency outflows prompted the Riksbank to increase interest rates.53  To reduce inflation, 
the government tightened fiscal policy (OECD, 1992: 11), a significant change in macro-
economic policy for an SAP government that previously prioritised high employment.  
As the economy depended on tight fiscal and monetary policies this meant keeping 
inflation at the European level, even at the cost of unemployment, something previously 
unacceptable.54  The January 1991 budget highlighted the consolidation of monetarist 
ideas, as low inflation became the objective of economic policy (OECD, 1992: 39). 
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The internationalization of financial markets restricted the ability of the 
government to pursue economic policies diverging from those of other capitalist states, 
forming a ‘cognitive lock’ (Blyth, 2002).  Policies disapproved of by industrialists (and 
foreign currency dealers) became increasingly difficult to implement (Marshall, 1996: 9).  
The SAP’s decision to apply for European Community (EC) membership in 1990 was a 
response to the problem of capital outflow.55 
The 1991 election saw the opposition parties reach consensus around monetarist 
ideas, a coherent set of alternative theories to rectify the economy.  Polls conducted prior 
to the election by Svenska Dagbladet suggested majority support for the opposition.56  
Following the election, Carl Bildt, leader of the Moderate Party, formed a four-party 
government advocating a switch to monetarism.  Svenska Dagbladet called the election 
result the end of an era,57 a sentiment echoed in the Financial Times.58  The Guardian 
stated bluntly that the SAP was defeated because ‘they have messed up the economy.’59  
Bildt summed up the result as ‘‘a massive mandate for change.’’60  Thus, a range of 
agents consolidated around a new set of economic ideas to replace those that had 
collapsed.  As the orthodoxy underpinning extant policies was replaced, these polices lost 
the ideational armour that had protected them from change.  Sweden had accepted the 
idea of an alternative economic paradigm.  ‘‘We have moved to the right in Sweden,’ 
observed Bjorn von Sydow from the Prime Minister’s office, ‘for the simple reason that 
the Social Democrats could no longer match higher spending with higher taxes.’’61 
The coalition government sought to fundamentally change the economy’s 
structure.  To right the economy it slashed the role of the state,62 selling its shares in 34 
companies,63 with a value of SKr250 billion.64  The preamble to the law instituting this 
policy stated that private ownership and free competition were the best foundation for a 
strong economy (Hadenius, 1997: 151).  Carl Bildt’s message was that the state should 
not strive after doing what a free society can better manage.  In limiting how far state 
responsibility should extend, Bildt challenged the conventional wisdom since the 1930s.65  
According to the OECD (1992: 44) a central element of the new economic programme 
was reduced taxes, matched to reduced spending, to encourage efficiency.  Competitive 
forces were given a greater role in allocating resources in the economy (OECD, 1992: 
40).  The new administration reduced the benefit system, and began abolishing the 
employee investment funds,66 using their resources to support the development of 
companies (Hadenius, 1997: 153).  This change reflected concerns that the expansion of 
the public sector involved high costs in lost economic dynamism, and had undermined 
Sweden’s growth prospects.  In 1992 union representatives were expelled from most 
commissions, committees, and agencies.  In seeking to change Sweden from social 
democracy to a more free market economy this government achieved more in its first six 
weeks in office than any pervious non-socialist administration.67  
Contrary to the framework’s overarching hypothesis – as it failed to identify an 
economic crisis in Sweden – the dominant economic orthodoxy still collapsed.  The SAF, 
acting as a policy entrepreneur, introduced monetarist ideas, around which consensus 
developed, leading to their consolidation.  Following the SAP’s electoral defeat, the non-
socialist government, under political entrepreneur Carl Bildt, changed the settings, 
instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind economic policy - a third order policy change. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
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TABLE 3 HERE 
 
According to the framework, in both cases there were third order changes (paradigm 
shifts) in macro-economic policy.  In Ireland (1986-1987) policy change occurred 
following what the framework identified as a macroeconomic crisis, the collapse of the 
dominant economic orthodoxy, the introduction of new ideas into the policy arena, and 
the subsequent consolidation of change agents around these ideas.  In Sweden (1990-
1992) third order policy change also occurred in the wake of ideational change.  
However, Swedish ideational change was not preceded by what the framework rated as 
macroeconomic crisis.  Nevertheless, most experts consider the Swedish economy to be 
in crisis at that time. 
 This raises questions as to the sensitivity of the observable implications employed 
in the framework, and especially those relating macroeconomic crisis.  The findings do 
not show that a quantifiable macro-economic crisis is a necessary precondition for a 
paradigm shift in macro-economic policy to occur.  However, it is clear that the 
perception of crisis, as opposed to its verifiable identification, can be crucial in 
influencing the trajectory of policy formulation (Hay, 1999: 322).  This fits with Blyth’s 
(2002: 9) argument that agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a 
crisis before collective action to resolve uncertainty can be taken.  So, employing a 
universal set of observable implications for identifying macroeconomic crisis, although a 
commendable effort, is not ideal.  Instead, the criteria could be broadened, developed 
without a set cut off points, and, as a result, more encompassing.  Alternatively, the 
criteria could be structured in a more case specific manner, to take account of actors’ path 
dependent expectations of economic performance.  This would ensure that the 
observables are more nuanced, and sensitive.  
Once change agents agreed that the prevailing policy paradigm was inadequate, 
and consolidated around a new ideational orthodoxy, policy change followed.  To 
paraphrase Hay (1999: 339), actors are unified in a crisis through their discursive 
construction of crisis.  In terms of Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework verifiable 
exogenous shocks are not as important as endogenous actors’ perceptions of shocks.  
Once actors believe there is a crisis extant policy is no longer secure.  Economic shocks 
can only be fully understood in context.  Integrating into the concept of critical junctures 
actors’ perceptions of crisis, and their role in the process of ideational change, is 
pragmatic, emphasising context matters.  This fits with the importance of actors’ path 
dependent expectations of economic performance.     
 The framework shows that ideation change is crucial for macro-economic policy 
change.  Extant ideational orthodoxy protects existing macro-economic policy.  However, 
should ideational collapse occur, then existing macro-economic policy is no longer 
secure.  This constitutes the window of opportunity Kingdon (1995) spoke of for new 
policy ideas.  If change agents, led by a political entrepreneur, consolidate around a new 
set of economic ideas, the result will be ideational change, and a third order change in 
macro-economic policy.  ‘Groups and individuals are not merely spectators as conditions 
change to favour or penalize them in the political balance of power, but rather strategic 
actors capable of acting on “openings” provided by shifting contextual conditions’ 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 17).   
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However, the framework fails to explain how newly consolidated ideas are 
transformed into policy change.  The case studies can give us an idea of the process, 
through examining the activities of political entrepreneurs in the policy making arena.  
But, the framework’s assumption that once a new idea is consolidated third order policy 
change will follow automatically is overly simplistic.  Although, in the case studies here, 
as in the case studies conducted by Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008), ideational change 
was followed by third order policy change, it is unrealistic to assume that this will always 
be the way.  Surely, the framework must be extended to encompass an understanding of 
the activities of political entrepreneurs as they champion new ideas in the policy making 
environment.  Factors such as political uncertainly in the wake of extant policy failure 
during a crisis should be accounted for.  In other words, the framework requires another 
layer of analysis; this to take account of developments at what Polsby (1984) refers to as 
the threshold between policy invention and adoption.  Such a layer would provide better 
insights into how new ideas become policy, and what order of policy change results.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper sought to test a framework based upon the hypothesis that a critical juncture in 
macro-economic policy consists of: macro-economic crisis, ideational change, and 
radical policy change.  Of the case studies examined, Ireland (1986-1987) fulfilled all 
three stages.  However, Sweden (1990-1992) experienced radical policy change in the 
wake of ideational change, but, this ideational change was not preceded by what the 
framework deemed a macroeconomic crisis.  This was despite the fact that most experts, 
and nearly all of the qualitative (subjective) observables employed within the framework, 
considered the Swedish economy to have been in crisis at that time.  The Swedish case 
does not so much undermine the framework’s central hypothesis, as its employment of 
supposedly universally applicable observables for identifying macroeconomic crisis, and 
in particular the specific quantitative (objective) observables selected. 
 We conclude that setting out standard “universal criteria” that must be met in 
order for there to be an economic crisis is unhelpful.  Subjective criteria and endogenous 
factors, and therefore context, are as important when examining a potential crisis.  
Actors’ perceptions of a crisis, and more specifically their role in the process of 
ideational change to deal with that crisis, are key components leading to third order 
change in macro-economic policy.  Established policies, and the protection afforded by 
their underpinning ideas, having been brought into question by a crisis, and ideational 
collapse, are liable to be overcome by change agents consolidating around new ideas.  
For the framework the presence, or absence, of ideational change is crucial in 
determining if there will be a third order change in macro-economic policy – and 
consequently a critical juncture.  However, this allows for instances where radical policy 
change occurs in the absence of what this rigid framework would rate as an exogenous 
shock.   
 The framework’s failure to attempt to explain how new ideas actually become 
policy is one of its major drawbacks.  To assume that new ideas, once consolidated, will 
automatically result in third order policy change is overly simplistic.  The framework 
should try to encompass an understanding of the activities of political entrepreneurs as 
they champion new ideas in the policy making environment.  This, at least, would permit 
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greater insights into how new ideas become policy, while also allowing for the possibility 
that first, second, or third order policy changes might occur.   
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Appendix A 
Macroeconomic Crisis Observable Implications 
O1. If annual GDP growth (Pei and Adesnik, 2000); GDP growth per capita; and 
GDP growth averaged over 5 years were stagnant or negative, then the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O2. If GNI per capita ppp growth was stagnant or negative, then the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O3. If national debt, as a percentage of GDP, was above 100 per cent, then the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O4. If national debt, as a percentage of GDP, was increasing at above 15 per cent, 
per annum, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O5. If the importation of goods and services; and the level of trade openness 
declined, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O6. If FDI inflows, and FDI inward stock declined, then the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O7. If gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP declined, then economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O8. If the annual inflation rate was above 15 per cent (Pei and Adesnik, 2000), then 
the economy may have been in crisis. 
O9. If the annual interest rate was above 15 per cent, then the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O10. If the annual unemployment rate was above 15 per cent, then the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O11. If opinion polls regarded the economic in crisis, then the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O12. If the national/international media regarded the economy in crisis, then the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O13. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis, then 
the economy may have been in crisis. 
O14. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O15. If both domestic and international organisations (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)) regarded the economy in crisis, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O16. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O17. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis 
management approach, the economy  
may have been in crisis. 
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Appendix B  
Idea Generation Observable Implications  
Ideational Collapse 
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the current model and/or specific 
policy areas.  
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose 
alternative ideas – at election time their platform will be built around these 
alternatives. 
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations, 
consumer groups etc. critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s (1989: 12) 
coalition-centred approach. 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable 
through opinion polls, protests etc. 
O5. External or international organizations critique the current model and/or 
actively disseminate alternative ideas. 
New Ideational Consolidation  
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs, are 
evident. 
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) injecting new ideas into the 
policy arena is evident. 
O8. The Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus around a replacement paradigm 
 
Appendix C 
Policy Change Observable Implications 
O1.  If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly; for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O2.  If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly; for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly; for longer than 
one government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy. 
                                                 
1 http://www.budget.gov.ie/2002/2001outturn.asp. 
2 The Irish Times, 3 February, 1987, p. 6. 
3 Irish Independent, 4 February, 1987, p. 8. 
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Figure 3: Debt and Economic Openness 
 32
                                                                                                                                                 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
Debt/GDP
Trade Openness %
Imports of Goods
and Services (% of
GDP)
Exports of Goods
and Services (% of
GDP)
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
Figure 4: FDI and Gross Capital Formation 
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
Change in FDI Inflows
%
Change in FDI Inward
Stock %
Inward FDI Stock (%
of GDP)
Gross Capital
formation (% of GDP)
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
Figure 5: Interest/Inflation/Unemployment Rates 
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Figure 7: Debt and Economic Openness 
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Figure 8: FDI and Gross Capital Formation 
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Table 1 – The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis 
Observable Implications  Ireland Sweden 
 1986-1987 1990-1992 
O1. Main GDP indicators stagnant/negative? X X 
O2. GNI per capita PPP growth stagnant/negative? X X 
O3. National debt above 100% of GDP 
O4. National debt/GDP rising at +15% per annum? 
X  
X 
O5. Importations and trade openness declined?  X  
O6. FDI inflows, and FDI inward stock decline? X  
O7. Gross capital formation as % of GDP declined? X  
O8.  Annual inflation greater than 15%?   
O9.  Annual interest greater than 15%?   
O10.  Annual unemployment greater than 15%? X  
O11. Opinion polls regard the economy in crisis? X  
O12. Media regard economy in crisis? X X 
O13. Commentators regard economy in crisis? X X 
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O14. Central bank regard economy in crisis? X  
O15. Domestic/international orgs regard economy in 
crisis? 
X X 
O16. Politicians regard economy in crisis? X X 
O17. Gov. pronouncements on economy consistent 
with crisis management approach? 
X X 
   
Economic Crisis Y  N 
 
 
Table 2 – The Identification of Ideational Change  
Observable Implications   Ireland Sweden 
 1986-1987 1990-1992 
Extant Ideational Collapse   
O1. Media questions efficacy of current economic model and/or 
specific policy areas. 
X X 
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose 
alternative economic ideas – at elections their platforms are built 
around these ideas. 
X X 
O3. Civil society organisations critique current model, reflecting 
Hall’s coalition-centred approach.  
X X 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, 
observable through opinion polls, protests etc. 
X X 
O5. External/international organisations critique current model 
and/or actively disseminate alternative economic ideas 
X X 
 
New Ideational Consolidation  
  
O6. A clear set of alternative economic ideas are evident X X 
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject new 
ideas into the policy arena is evident 
X X 
New Ideational Consolidation Y Y 
 
 
Table 3 – The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy 
Observable Implications   Ireland Sweden 
 1986-1987 1990-1992 
O1.  If economic policy instrument settings changed there may 
have been a radical change in economic policy.  
X X 
O2.  If the instruments of economic policy changed there may 
have been radical change in government economic policy.  
X X 
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed 
there may have been a radical change in government economic 
policy.  
X X 
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy  Y Y 
 
 
 
